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ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER. By Richard
Dale. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1980. Pp. xv, 237. $22.50.

"Dumping" is the colorful and pejorative term used to describe
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international price discrimination. 1 Most advanced economies police the import frontier through either domestic antidumping laws or
multilateral treaties like the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade2 (GATT). In Anti-Dumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order,
Richard Dale canvasses existing regulatory approaches and argues
that "national and international anti-dumping laws lack solid intellectual foundations and are generally in direct conflict with elementary principles of welfare economics" (p. 1). After reviewing the
objectives and efficacy of present practices, he concludes that these
laws and agreements are "at best superfluous and at worst an impediment to commerce" (p. 196). Dale's treatment of this complex subject is both comprehensive3 and analytically sound, and his book is a
valuable addition to the sparse literature in the area.
Dale's premise is that the only legitimate function that antidumping law can serve is preservation of competition in domestic markets.4 Most economists would find this premise uncontroversial, if
not self-evident. But the history of antidumping legislation and current political realities make it clear that domestic producers and politicians are often more concerned with protection than Pareto
optimality.5 Dale ably demonstrates that many of the conventional
defenses of antidumping law - protecting domestic employment or
the balance of trade and preventing unfair competition, for example
- are protectionist when reduced to their economic essentials.6 He
argues that relaxation of antidumping laws would result in a more
efficient long-run allocation of resources.
Dale begins his argument by examining the classical categories of
1. The classic work in the field is J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (1923). For a more recent examination of the subject, see W. WARES, THE THEORY OF
DUMPING AND AMERICAN COMMERICAL POLICY (1977).
2. The most recent GATT agreement, commonly referred to as the Tokyo Round, was the
seventh in a series of negotiations that started in 1948. See AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE
TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt 1 (1979). The U.S. enabling legislation for this agreement was enacted in
1979. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 13, U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980), 19, 26, 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1980)).
3. In addition to the excellent international survey of antidumping legislation, Dale places
dumping in an historical perspective, pp. 1-12, and he provides a chapter on the special
problelllS involved in dumping cases initiated against manufacturers in socialist or centrally
planned economies. Pp. 172-96.
4. "[T]he objective of anti-dumping action, construed in tellllS of welfare economics, must
be to identify temporarily low import prices with a view to avoiding ultimately excessive import prices •..." P. 11.
5. See e.g., Ehrenhaft, Whal the Antidumping and Countervailing .Duty Provisions of tlze
Trade Agreements Act /Can/ [Wi/Q /Should] Mean lo U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW & POL. INTL.
Bus. 1361, 1364, 1374 (1979) (steel and chemical industries most frequently invoke the antidumping laws, most antidumping cases are 'pimples on the trade landscape,' and no data
exist to prove that operation of the antidumping laws is necessary to protect domestic industry
from ruinous competition).
6. AdalllS, Import Restraints and Industrial Performance: The .Dilemma ofProtectionism, l
MICH. Y.B. INTL. LEGAL STUD. 34 (1979).
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dumping identified in Professor Viner's seminal treatise. 7 He concludes, as have other commentators, that only predatory dumping
poses a significant threat of anticompetitive consequences (p. 10). 8
The dearth of documented cases of truly predatory dumping supports Dale's contention that this justification, although theoretically
sound, is practically tenuous (pp. 10, 31). 9 Dale also points out the
perversity of the tendency of "importing countries generally [to] view
with extreme disfavour foreign monopolistic practices leading to differentially low import prices [while] countenanc[ing] such practices
when they result in differentially high import prices" (p. 39). The
one-way focus of most antidumping legislation reduces consumer
welfare by concentrating on nonpredatory import practices while ignoring harmful "reverse dumping" - sales at prices above those
prevailing in the exporter's home market.
After establishing a theoretical framework, Dale scrutinizes the
GATT antidumping provisions to determine their compatibility with
his approach. He concludes that Article VI of GATT is protectionist
insofar as it embraces a "diversion of business" standard for the imposition of sanctions. This watered-down injury standard permits
GATT signatories to impose antidumping duties whenever domestic
market share is reduced, regardless of whether the offending imports
are priced above their average variable cost of production. Economists, however, generally concede that selling at or above the average variable cost of production is a rational, nonpredatory pricing
strategy where demand varies but productive capacity remains constant.10 Because he believes that imposing antidumping duties in
such situations restricts free trade, Dale calls for reexamination of
Article VI (p. 60-61 ).
One useful feature of the book is its country-by-country review of
antidumping legislation. Dale's reading of this legislation comports
with his thesis that most antidumping legislation is protectionist. He
buttresses this general survey with a chapter that recounts the Ameri7. J. VINER, supra note 1.
A general classification of (l) sporadic, (2) intermittent, and (3) continuous dumping is
accepted in the literature on the subject. P. 8. Intermittent dumping seeks to eliminate competition by lowering prices and subsequently raising them to monopolistic levels. This type of
predatory behavior is recognized as the most detrimental form of dumping. Fisher, .Dumping:
Confronting the Paradox ef Internal Weakness and External Challenge, 1 MICH, Y.B. INTL.
LEGAL STUD. 11, 13 (1979).
8. See, e.g., Barcel6, THE ANTIDUMPING LAW: REPEAL IT OR REVISE IT, l MICH. Y.B.
INTL. LEGAL STUD. 53, 65 (1979) (antipredation should be the controlling principle in formulating antidumping policy); Ehrenhaft, An Administrator's Look at Antidumping .Duty Lows in
United States Trade Policy, l MicH. Y.B. INTL. LEGAL STUD. 97,103 (comparative advantage
should be bedrock principle of antidumping policy).
9. The unlikelihood of a monopolist using predatory dumping has also been noted by P.
LLOYD, ANTI-DUMPING ACTIONS AND THE GATT SYSTEM 8 (1977) and Barcel6,supra note 8,
at 64-65.
10. See, e.g., P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS 468 (9th ed. 1973)
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can steel industry's efforts to restrict foreign competition. These efforts eventually led to the creation of a "trigger price mechanism"
that insulates the industry from cyclical variations in import prices
that would be economically beneficial (pp. 164-65). 11 Some evidence
indicates that several industries, notably steel and chemicals, have
been the primary beneficiaries of American antidumping law, but it
is not clear that Dale's focus on the steel industry presents a truly
balanced picture.
Dale's proposed solution to the dumping debacle is one that will
be familiar to many readers: the Areeda-Turner test for anticompetitive pricing. 12 This test incorporates the principle that only
prices below marginal variable cost are generally anticompetitive,
while prices above that level may represent procompetitive, profitmaximizing behavior. This test would not inhibit beneficial price
competition and would tend to force inefficient domestic producers
out of markets where they lacked a comparative advantage relative
to foreign producers. Dale's solution is consistent with accepted economic wisdom and would, to the extent that the Areeda-Turner test
is used in antitrust proceedings, ensure consistency between two areas of law that spring from similar policy concerns.
In the book's concluding section, Dale recommends that national
dumping legislation be replaced by a revised "escap_e clause" under
GATT Article XIX (p. 196). He would rely on the escape clause in
cases where industries were threatened with severe dislocation as a
result of low import prices. The clause would cushion industries and
blunt protectionist pressure for more restrictive antidumping legislation. At a minimum, Dale argues, the Areeda-Turner test should be
used to ferret out only predatory dumping.
Dale's careful economic analysis of antidumping law should convince the reader of the need for reform. Although the argument in
support of his proposed reforms is not as strong as it might be because he does not suggest how to overcome protectionist opposition,
this is but a minor flaw. The analysis of current legislation is comprehensive and compelling, and the book should be required reading
for anyone interested in attempts to regulate international trade.

11. G. ALLEN, How JAPAN COMPETES 20-21, 44 (Hobart Paper No. 81 1978) argues that
Japan has seldom, if ever, been accused of predatory dumping and that industrial efficiency
and a modem industrial structure are the main reasons for the low price of Japan's steel
exports.
12. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 ofthe Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. R.Ev. 697 (1975). The Areeda-Tumer test has also been discussed in the
context of dumping by Barcel6, supra note 8, at 68.

